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MR. SEWALL ON THE PERSONALITY OF GOD.
IN COMMENT ON HIS BOOK "REASON IN BELIEF."i
BY THE EDITOR.
THE Rev. Frank Sewall is the minister of the New Church at
Washington, and is a leader of that branch of Christianity
which is characterized by its reverence for Swedenborg as the
prophet of the new dispensation. He has written the present book
as an exposition of his Christianity, and the burden of his message
is given in the sub-title which reads "Faith for an Age of Science."
On the one hand he makes an examination into the rational and
philosophical content of the Christian faith, and on the other points
out the insufficiency of science unaided by revelation. We recognize
the spirit of growing intellectuality which is characterized in the
motto selected from the Jowett lectures, and reads as follows: "It
would save infinite pain and loss if religion could grasp and satisfy
men in their hours of intellectual activity, instead of merely finding
an entrance through emotion, and being retained because it merely
meets the cravings of human nature."
It is not our intention to enter into an exposition of Sweden-
borgian philosophy as here represented by one of its faithful fol-
lowers. We will merely limit ourselves to reproducing Mr. Sewall's
arguments in favor of the old doctrine of the personality of God.
We will not even attempt to justify our own position which he
criticizes in chapter \', page 66 fif., but will only limit our reply to
a few comments explanatory of our own position. Mr. Sewall's
argument is summed up in these words on page 70: "Except God
be a Person there can be no science founded on universal laws, be-
cause there can be no universal relation, because relation exists in
mind alone, and mind exists in person alone. The essence of the
idea of person is that of self-conscious, self-active mind."
' London : Elliot Stock, 1906.
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Mr. Scwall's argument rests on Kant's idea that all formal
knowledge is a priori, and exists in the mind only and can not exist
by itself. This is Kant's theory which the philosopher of Konigs-
berg calls critical idealism. It is a problem which we have discussed
at length in our edition of a translation of Kant's Prolegomena.
The significance of it is ftdly recognized, but while we believe that
Kant pointed out the way to the philosophical problem, we believe
that he did not give us a correct solution, and we will say here that
it would not be safe to refer to Kant as a reliable authority, and
especially for a Swedenborgian, for Kant's wholesale rejection of
Swedenborg and his remarkable visions is sufficiently known.- We
reproduce Mr. Sewall's reference to our discussion of the God
problem with Pere Hyacinthe r'^
"I noticed some time ago in a metaphysical journal a discus-
sion between the editor and the celebrated French preacher, the
Rev. M. Loyson, known before he left the Roman Church as Father
Hyacinthe, on the subject of the Personality of God. The tone
of the discussion was most courteous and friendly on both sides,
and the views presented were broad and deep, and, therefore,
they naturally coincided in many important points ; but the one
subject on which there seemed to be a very essential disagreement
was as to—not the existence of God, for this was emphatically as-
serted by both—but as to how far personality is a necessary attribute
of God. To the claim put forward by the brilliant Frenchman, that
to take away the attribute of personality— i. e., of intelligence and
will from God is to destroy the idea of God altogether, the editor
replied that God may be non-personal without being impersonal : in
other words, that God's non-personality may be of a kind to be
called super-personal rather than impersonal ; admitting that God
may have personality of some kind, but if so, that it is a kind
entirely above our apprehension or any of the attributes that we at-
tach to personality. His argument to prove this was that there are
things anterior to personality—older, therefore, than personality,
and that personality is therefore not a proper attribute of the eternal.
Of these things which he claimed arc older than personality he in-
stanced the law of number or the axioms of mathematics. That
two and two are four, he said, is an eternal truth, older than an\-
personal intelligence or knowledge of it.
' See Kant's book on The Visions of Mclapliysics and the hlctaphysics of
a Visionary.
'For fnrtlicr information of the controversy referred to by Mr. Sewall,
we will state that it appeared in The Open Court, for October, 1897. Com-
pare also the editor's article on "God" in The Monist, for October, 1898.
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"But Kant has shown that the axioms of mathematics have all
their validity in the a priori intuitions of succession and extension—
or of time and space, which belong exclusively to mind. There
is, therefore, no mathematical truth, nor mathematical law, which
does not imply the co-existence of mind, or of personality, to com-
prehend it. I say comprehend it, rather than apprehend it, for the
word apprehension applies to things without self, while comprehen-
sion means the holding or embracing things within self ; and this
must that Infinite do, which to borrow Swedenborg's expression 'is
called infinite because it has infinite things in itself
—
Vocatiis in-
Unifiis quia iniinita in sc habct (D. L. W., nos. 17-22).
"The Divine Personality, the Mind in which alone the universal
relations are possible, in which the certain, that is, the mathematical
truth rests, is, therefore, the source and cradle of even the axioms
of mathematics, and not some outbirth or evolution from them.
There would, in other words, be no axioms without the Infinite
Mind, the imiversal synthesis, to first give them birth. There is no
relation of any two things in the things themselves. The things
are there in their eternal isolation. If anything is between them,
such as what we call relation, it is either, therefore, what we call
the mind itself, or what the mind puts there. The same is true of
the impressions of these things. These are equally, as Hume says,
in themselves eternally isolated. It is the mind only that constructs
a relation between them.
"When we say, 'two and two make four,' we are bringing sets
of things wholly Mathout relation in themselves, into a relation which
we, in our purely mental, that is personal, capacity, put around them.
Even parts are not parts of a whole, except so far as mind sees
them in that relation, nor is the whole made up of its parts. There
is but one mind that can comprehend the whole, made up of all
the parts of universal being. To 'comprehend' these parts, to bring
them into the relation of a whole, there must be a mind ; to bring
them 'air into such a relation that mind must be infinite.
"In the light of these deductions from Kant's doctrine of the
a priori nature of the mind's categories of number and relation, it
appears how contradictory is the aforenamed editor's idea of a
relation of numbers prior to the mind in which alone such relation
can exist, and that there can be any absolute source of things above,
or anterior to, that mind in which all things first obtain their distinct
existence as forms in relation. Is not this the Logos which 'in the
beginning was with God, and was God,' and by whom 'all things-
were made that were made?'
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"Here is that Divine Personality wliicli is st)niethin.<;- more tlian
an arbitrary creation of man's moral nature, produced in order to
satisfy his own aspirations after the i^^ood. It is not a projection
hom the reason, and so anthropomorphic in the intellectual sense.
It is rather theomorphic as projecting" the reason from itself, or
making' the human reason possible.
"This then is the infinite knowledge of which Revelation de-
clares : 'Great is the Lord ; His understanding is infinite.' This is
that Divine Personality which is the source of the axiomatic knowl-
edge of universal relation—i. e., the relation of all the parts which
make up the great whole. Plence we see the assent which reason
and philosophy must bring, in all humility and reverence, to the
challenge of the Scriptures: 'He that teacheth man knowledge? Shall
He not know?'
We see that a knowdedge of universal relation must lie at the
basis of, as giving security for, the finite mind's knowledge of any
relation: and the Divine Personality of the Infinite must pre-exist
as the final and real basis of human knowledge. For 'Thine eye
did see my substance yet being unperfect: and in Thy book all my
members were written, which in continuance were fashioned wdien
as vet there were none of them.' (Ps. cxxxix. 16.)"
As stated above we do not intend to recapitulate the arguments
in favor of our conception of a super-personal God. We will only
point out that apparently we use some terms in a different sense
from Mr. Sewall and that our conception of mind apparently differs
from his. We understand by mind an organism which is character-
ized by a definite order systematically arranged according to rules
of logic, and which has originated under the influence of sense-
impressions which are methodically grouped and so arranged as to
work like a logical thinking machine, all serving the purpose of
adaptation to the surrounding world. According to our understand-
ing, mind is the product of a development, and mind such as we
know it exists in an infinite variety graded according to its capa-
bilities from the animal world to the domain of rational thought,
as it appears in man, rising even to the height of genius in specimens
of extraordinary perfection. It is obvious that according to our
definition God is not a mind, but rather the prototype of mind. An
animal mind is incapable of thinking in clear abstract terms. It
depends mainly on its immediate sense-impressions, and the thought
of past and future is only vaguely outlined.
The relations which exist between things are recognized as re-
lations only by mind, but they are of an objective character. They
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exist whether or not they are perceived and their existence con-
stitutes the bond of humanity in the objective world. The forms,
the laws of form and the whole constitution of their interconnections
are not, as Kant claims, "ideal" or subjective but objective. As Kant
himself says, they are universal and necessary. Such relations are
the omnipresent factors which shape the world and with it all sentient
beings, because consciousness of them appears as mind in the animal
world, and develops into personality as soon as it rises to the summit
of clear abstract thought.
The original world-order from which mind rises is, as it were,
the objective norm of all logical thought, and it is this feature of the
objective world which the neo-Platonists call the eternal ideas or
the Logoi. As soon as the unity of all ideas is recognized this sys-
tem of the logical world-order is called the Logos, a term which
was accepted by the early Christians and has rightly been identified
with Christ in the aspect of his eternal character ; religiously speak-
ing, as the son of God begotten since eternity. This Logos, how-
ever, the aboriginal world order, is not a mind but the prototype of
mind. It is the eternal norm from which mind originates.
We are far from denying the usefulness and even the need of
mysticism in religion, and we believe w^e have a sympathetic recog-
nition of the conception of God as held by Rev. Frank Sewall. We
do not believe in the advisability of entering farther into a discus-
sion of the differences and will therefore be satisfied with the gen-
eral comments here given. We will further say that Father Hya-
cinthe's conception of God will in many respects be found similar
to that of Mr. Sewall ; but Father Hyacinthe, a man originally
trained in Catholic philosophy, would presumably grant more to our
conception of God than Mr. Sewall. At any rate we found in a
personal discussion of the God problem that we had much more in
common than we had originally anticipated. Father Hyacinthe was
fully appreciative of broad philosophical thought which would avoid
the emotional and almost mythological tendency of the current theol-
ogy, and he noted in our own position the respect for the right of
the theologian to conceive his ideas of God and other spiritual fac-
tors, in the allegories of mysticism.
